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Introduction
An early form of workers’ compensation was depicted in
Alexander O. Exquemelin’s 1678 account of Caribbean buccaneers.1
According to Exquemelin, the buccaneers drew up “an agreement or
chasse partie” as to how to divide the loot up amongst officers, crew
members, and crew members wounded during the voyage. 2 This early
form of workers’ compensation awarded either six hundred pieces of
eight or six slaves for the loss of a right arm. 3 If a man were to lose
the use of his arm he would be awarded the same amount as if the
arm had been severed. 4 And for “a severe internal injury which meant
the victim had to have a pipe inserted in his body [he] would earn 500
pieces of eight or five slaves in recompense.” 5 The injured buccaneer’s
share was first withdrawn from the total amount to ensure that the
injured man was cared for before the remaining loot was divided up
amongst the remaining crew members. 6
The buccaneers’ early form of workers’ compensation predates the
American system by over three centuries. Workers’ compensation programs did not arise in the United States until the Twentieth

1.

Alexander O. Exquemelin, The Buccaneers of America (Alexis
Brown trans., Dover Publ’ns 2000) (1678).

2.

Id. at 71.

3.

Id.

4.

Id.

5.

Id.

6.

Id.
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Century. 7 Workers’ compensation developed support as a type of
grand bargain between the employee and the employer. Under this
system, an injured employee agreed to surrender their common-law
right to sue for damages that fell within the scope of workers’
compensation in exchange for specific guaranteed benefits. 8 Beginning
in the 1980s there was an increase in legislation that was intended to
curb the increasing costs of workers’ compensation programs. 9 By
1997, over two-thirds of states passed legislation that tended to curb
the rising costs by decreasing both the right to compensation and the
amount of benefits an injured worker is entitled to receive. 10
The call for legislative reform to traditional state-run workers’
compensation programs continues today. Support has increased within
the last few years for alternative “opt-out” programs in response to
the perceived failings of the state-run programs regarding both rising
costs and decreased benefits. 11 Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee,
and Florida proposed legislation that would create alternative opt-out
programs to the traditional state-run programs. 12 In 2013, Oklahoma
became the second state in the country to pass legislation creating an
alternative to the traditional state-run workers’ compensation programs. 13 Supporters like John D. Doak, the Oklahoma Insurance Commissioner, assert that alternative plans cut costs while increasing the

7.

Lex K. Larson & Arthur Larson, Workers’ Compensation Law 21
(5th ed. 2013) (observing that the legislatures of New York, Massachusetts,
Minnesota, New Jersey, Connecticut, Ohio, Illinois, Wisconsin, Montana, and
Washington had created commissions to investigate workers’ compensation
legislation by 1910).

8.

Id. at 4.

9.

Id. at 25 (noting that rising costs were associated with a combination of
factors including medical care; an increase in number, length, and
litigiousness of proceedings; attorney involvement; and the perception of
widespread fraud amongst workers).

10.

Id.

11.

Michael Grabell & Howard Berkes, Inside Corporate America’s Campaign to
Ditch Workers’ Comp, ProPublica (Oct. 14, 2015), https://www.
propublica.org/article/inside-corporate-americas-plan-to-ditch-workers-comp
[https://perma.cc/ZV4E-WVZ5]; Michael Moline, House Freshman’s Workers’ Comp Bill Would Render System Voluntary, Fla. Pol. (Dec. 7, 2016),
http://floridapolitics.com/archives/228432-workers-comp-4 [https://perma
.cc/RPG3-E9LV].

12.

See, e.g., S.B. 1062, 54th Leg., 1st Sess. (Okla. 2013); H.B. 4197, 121st Sess.
(S.C. 2015); H.B. 997, 109th Gen. Assemb. (Tenn. 2015). The Florida bill
referenced in the previous footnote has yet to be filed officially.

13.

Zeke Campfield, Oklahoma State Senate Approves Workers’ Comp Overhaul,
NewsOK (Feb. 27, 2013), http://newsok.com/article/3759633 [https://
perma.cc/Q2AM-LSVQ].

1376

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 67·Issue 4·2017
Opting Out of the Grand Bargain

competitiveness of the workers’ compensation insurance market. 14 Proponents allege that private alternative plans decrease costs for companies. 15 In 2016, Oklahoma reported a decrease for the fourth year in
a row according to the state insurance program. 16 In 2016, the
National Council on Compensation Insurance in Oklahoma filed an
overall loss cost decrease of 10.2% for workers’ compensation.17
Supporters credit the decrease in Oklahoma’s workers’ compensation
costs to declines in market experience, market trend, and recent
reforms to traditional workers’ compensation programs. 18 A recent
study by Alison Morantz, a Stanford law professor, supports the
proponents’ claims and found that companies saved around forty-four
percent when they replaced traditional workers’ compensation
programs with private plans. 19
In September 2016, the Oklahoma Supreme Court dealt a striking
blow to supporters of opt-out programs when it held that the
Oklahoma Employee Injury Benefit Act 20 (OEIBA) was
14.

Specifically, Doak claimed that the 2013 workers’ compensation reforms
enacted in 2013 were accomplished by replacing “an outdated adversarial
court system with the Workers’ Compensation Commission, increas[ing] the
competitiveness of our workers’ compensation insurance markets, and develop[ing] an innovative solution to workplace injuries,” resulting in annually
decreasing costs. Stephanie K. Jones, Oklahoma Supreme Court Rules Workers’ Comp Opt-Out Unconstitutional, Ins. J. (Sept. 14, 2016), http://www.
insurancejournal.com/news/southcentral/2016/09/14/426439.htm [https://
perma.cc/8FGP-ZAVC].

15.

See Joanne Sammer, Opting Out: Are Alternative Workers’ Comp Programs
Viable?, Soc’y for Human Resource Mgmt. (Sept. 1, 2016), https://
www.shrm.org/hr-today/news/hr-magazine/0916/pages/opting-out-arealternative-workers'-comp-programs-viable.aspx [https://perma.cc/8JPUQLSX] (“From an employer’s standpoint, opt-out plans could reduce their
expenses substantially.”).

16.

Oklahoma Workers’ Comp Loss Costs Fall 10.2%, Ins. J. (Sept. 9, 2016),
http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/southcentral/2016/09/09/425933.
htm [https://perma.cc/EWJ5-6K5V].

17.

Id.

18.

Id.

19.

Alison Morantz analyzed injury and illness claims filed by employees of fifteen Texas companies from 1998 to 2010. She found that the decrease in
costs was due to a decrease in the frequency of serious claims regarding replacement of lost wages and a decline in the overall costs associated with
each claim. Alison D. Morantz, Rejecting the Grand Bargain: What Happens
When Large Companies Opt Out of Workers’ Compensation? 47–48 (Stanford Law Sch., John M. Olin Program in Law & Econ., Working Paper No.
488, 2016), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2750134 [https://perma.cc/TGH898TX].

20.

2013 Okla. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 208, § 107 (West) (codified at Okla. Stat.
Ann. tit. 85a, § 200 (West 2017)).
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unconstitutional. 21 The Oklahoma Supreme Court’s decision does not
end the debate surrounding opt-out legislation. 22 Going forward,
Texas provides a model for states looking to enact alternative
programs, while Oklahoma provides a cautionary tale. Part I of this
Comment focuses on a brief history of workers’ compensation in the
United States. Part II focuses on Oklahoma’s system of workers’
compensation and their implementation of an alternative opt-out
program. Part III focuses on the opt-out program in Texas and how it
survived constitutional challenges, while Part IV analyzes whether the
opt-out programs can be emulated in states where the existing system
was created by a constitutional provision.

I. A Brief History of the Grand Bargain
Workers’ compensation in the United States arose as a result of
increasing industrialization in the Nineteenth Century and the
influence of systems created in Germany and England. 23 Beginning in
the early 1900s, various state commissions began investigations into
workers’ compensation. 24 Under the “industrial,” or “grand,” bargain,
employees gave up the common law right to bring a negligence action
against their employer in return for a predetermined amount of
benefits. 25 In 1910, the Uniform Workmen’s Compensation Law was
drafted during a Chicago conference 26 and New York adopted a type
of compulsory workers’ compensation system. 27
In 1911, however, the Court of Appeals in Ives v. South Buffalo
Railway Co., 28 held the New York system to be an unconstitutional
taking by imposing liability upon employers regardless of fault. 29 In
response to the Ives Court’s holding, the New York legislature passed
a constitutional amendment, effective January 1, 1914, which
21.

Vasquez v. Dillard’s, Inc., 2016 OK 89, 381 P.3d 768.

22.

See supra note 11 and accompanying text (noting the increased support
for alternative opt-out programs).

23.

Larson & Larson, supra note 7, at 20–21.

24.

Id. at 21.

25.

Parret v. UNICCO Serv. Co., 2005 OK 54, ¶ 20, 127 P.3d 572, 578, superseded by Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 85a, § 5 (West 2017).

26.

Larson & Larson, supra note 7, at 21.

27.

Id. See Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 674, 1910 N.Y. Laws 1945.

28.

94 N.E. 431 (1911).

29.

See id. at 448 (holding that “[a]ll that it is necessary to
before us is that in our view of the Constitution of our
sought to be imposed upon the employers enumerated in
us is a taking of property without due process of law,
therefore void”).
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permitted a mandatory workers’ compensation system. 30 The new
workers’ compensation law, passed after the amendment, took effect
on July 1, 1914, and provided for an exclusive remedy for injured
workers who, in lieu of a jury trial, would receive a set, predetermined
amount. 31 Compensation for injured workers was to be provided
regardless of fault unless the injured worker intended to injure or
cause the death of himself or another worker or if the injury was
solely due to the injured employee being intoxicated. 32
The new law establishing an exclusive remedy for injured workers
was challenged in N.Y. Central Railroad Co. v. White 33 as a violation
of the Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment rights and limiting the freedom to contract. 34 In a 9–0 decision, the United States Supreme Court
held that New York’s law did not violate equal protection or due
process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment, nor did it limit
freedom of contract. 35 This ruling paved the way for the expansion of
workers’ compensation in other states, and forty states adopted some
form of compensation acts by 1920. 36 Mississippi became the last of
the then existing forty-eight states to enact a workers’ compensation
system in 1949. 37 In the subsequent years, workers’ compensation
coverage was extended by adding jurisdictions and broadening the
30.

N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 195–96 (1917) (“Nothing contained in this constitution shall be construed to limit the power of the legislature . . . to provide that the right of such compensation, and the remedy
therefor shall be exclusive of all other rights and remedies for injuries to
employees or for death resulting from such injuries; or to provide that the
amount for such compensation for death shall not exceed a fixed or determinable sum . . . .”).

31.

See Act of December 16, 1913, ch. 816, 1913 N.Y. Laws 2277 (enacting the
legislation); Act of January 8, 1914, ch. 41, 1914 N.Y. Laws 216
(reenacting the legislation); N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co., 243 U.S. at 208–09
(holding that the New York law was constitutional); see also The N.Y.
State Workers’ Comp. Bd., The New York State Workers’
Compensation
Board
Centennial
6–7
(2014),
www.wcb.ny.gov/WCB_Centenial_Booklet
.pdf [https://perma.cc/FB87-DP6M] (discussing the adoption of New
York’s workers’ compensation law).

32.

N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co., 243 U.S. at 202.

33.

243 U.S. 188 (1917).

34.

Id. at 191, 206.

35.

Id. at 206–08 (holding that “the authority to prohibit contracts made in
derogation of a lawfully established policy of the state respecting
compensation for accidental death or disabling personal injury is . . . clear”
and that “the prescribed scheme of compulsory compensation is not
repugnant to the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment”).

36.

Larson & Larson, supra note 7, at 23.

37.

Id.
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boundaries of individual acts including people, employment, and the
kinds of injury, including occupational disease. 38
In 1970, Congress enacted the Occupational Safety and Health
Act. 39 This law created the National Commission on State Workmen’s
Compensation Laws. 40 The Commission was composed of fifteen members appointed by the President tasked with evaluating current programs and making recommendations for improvement. 41 The
Commission submitted their final report detailing the inadequacies of
existing programs in 1972. 42 The Commission made a large number of
recommendations for improvement in their report, including:
[C]ompulsory coverage in all acts; elimination of all numerical
and occupational exemptions to coverage, including domestic
and farm labor; full coverage of work-related diseases; full
medical and physical rehabilitation services without arbitrary
limits; a broad extra-territoriality provision; elimination of
arbitrary limits on duration or total sum of benefits; and a
weekly benefit maximum that rises from an immediate 66 2/3
percent to an ultimate 200 percent of average weekly wage in
the state. 43

The Commission recommended a three year time frame for states to
comply with the recommendations before federal intervention to
ensure compliance would begin. 44 In the ten years following the
Commission’s report, state legislation on workers’ compensation
greatly expanded benefits, including unlimited medical benefits and
occupational disease coverage, while an increasing number of
employees were covered. 45 The number of covered workers expanded
by at least five percentage points in almost half of states between
1968 and 1976. 46
38.

Id. at 23–24. In spite of the expansion of the workers’ compensation system,
not all workers were covered under it. For example, domestic and agricultural workers, small firms, and casual workers were still excluded from the
system. Id. at 24.

39.

Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91–596, 84 Stat.
1590 (1970).

40.

Larson & Larson, supra note 7, at 24.

41.

Id.

42.

Id.

43.

Id.

44.

Id.

45.

Id.

46.

Daniel N. Price, Workers’ Compensation Program in the 1970’s, 42 Soc.
Sec. Bull. 3, 7 (1979) (pointing out that in 1976, the proportion of covered
workers had risen by at least five percentage points from the 1968 numbers
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Perhaps the marked increase in expanded state coverage throughout the 1970s can be attributed to the looming possibility of federal
intervention in the event that the Commission’s minimum
recommended standards were not met. Throughout the 1970s, federal
legislators introduced various bills that were designed to make states
meet the Commission’s minimum standard. 47 None of these bills
passed through Congress, but the possibility of federal intervention
lingered over states if they failed to comply. 48 By the 1980s, state
focus shifted from achieving the Commission’s established standards
and turned toward specific problems like asbestos-related diseases. 49 In
the mid to late 1980s, state focus once again shifted—this time to
curtailing employers’ rising costs related to workers’ compensation. 50
By 1997, over two-thirds of states had enacted legislation aimed at
decreasing workers’ compensation costs through a variety of measures
while making it more difficult for injured workers to recover for
preexisting conditions, repetitive motion injuries, or stress-related
cases. 51 The focus on cost reduction continues today with a rise in
proposed legislation to allow employers to opt out of state-run
workers’ compensation programs and instead create alternative
private plans. 52

II. Workers’ Compensation in Oklahoma
Workers’ compensation was designed to provide injured workers
and their families with “a living and prevent them from becoming
public charges.” 53 The Oklahoma legislature created the Oklahoma
Workers’
Compensation
Commission,
which
applies
the
Administrative Workers’ Compensation Act 54 (AWCA) to employers

in thirteen states, while a similar increase was seen in eleven other states
between 1972 and 1976).
47.

Larson & Larson, supra note 7, at 24–25.

48.

Id. at 24.

49.

Id. at 24–25.

50.

Id. at 25.

51.

See id. (“[C]hanges commonly found in this legislation include (1) restrictions
on the right of the claimant to choose his or her medical provider, (2) utilization of managed care, (3) anti-fraud provisions, (4) measures designed to
reduce attorney involvement at the administrative level, (5) measures
designed to encourage early resolution of claims, and (6) measures designed
to reduce duplicate recovery among different reimbursement systems.”).

52.

See Grabell & Berkes, supra note 11.

53.

Corbin v. Wilkinson, 52 P.2d 45, 48 (Okla. 1935).

54.

Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 85A, § 1 (West 2017).
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and employees. 55 Currently, the AWCA applies to both employers and
employees in Oklahoma. 56 Nearly all employees in Oklahoma are
covered under the AWCA, with the exception of a few select groups.57
For example, employees whose employment is casual, or required due
to conviction of a criminal offense or incarceration, are not covered. 58
Additionally, employees covered by another workers’ compensation
system are not covered under the AWCA, nor are certain agricultural
and horticultural workers, some licensed real estate sales associates
and brokers, volunteers, and some domestic workers. 59
Under Oklahoma law, the rights and remedies guaranteed to employees under the AWCA are exclusive of all other rights and
remedies, so a covered employee does not have a right to tort
damages. 60 The exclusive remedy guaranteeing injured workers
compensation does not apply if, however, an intentional tort
committed by the employer caused the injury61 or if the employer fails
to pay the employee compensation as required by law. 62 If the
employer fails to pay the injured employee compensation due under
the AWCA, the employee can either make a claim for compensation
under the AWCA or file a claim for civil damages in an Oklahoma
district court. 63 Additionally, if an employer commits an intentional
tort, an employee has a right to file for civil damages in a district
court. 64 Under the AWCA, an employee cannot agree to waive his or
her right to compensation through any contract, regulation, or
device. 65 Oklahoma law further prevents employers from
discriminating or retaliating against an employee who engages in
protected activity under the AWCA. 66

55.

Okla. Admin. Code § 810:1-1-3 (2017).

56.

Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 85A, § 3(A) (West 2017).

57.

Id. § 2(18).

58.

Id. § 2(18)(a).

59.

Id. § 2(18).

60.

Id. § 5(A).

61.

Id. § 5(B)(2).

62.

Id. § 5(B)(1).

63.

Id. § 5(D).

64.

Id. § 5(I). Under Oklahoma law, an intentional tort exists only if the injury
occurs because of “willful, deliberate, specific intent” on behalf of the
employer against the employee. Id. § 5(B)(2).

65.

Id. § 8(A).

66.

Id. § 7(A).
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Before 2013, Oklahoma workers were covered under the Workers’
Compensation Code. 67 But, in 2013, this was repealed in favor of the
Administrative Workers’ Compensation Act, 68 which adopted the Oklahoma Employee Injury Benefit Act. 69 The constitutional challenges
began soon thereafter. On November 25, 2013, the Oklahoma Supreme
Court heard a constitutional challenge in Coates v. Fallin. 70 There,
the Court held that absent a clear constitutional defect it would
uphold the OEIBA because it is not the duty of the Court to rewrite
statutes “merely because the legislation does not comport with our
concept of prudent public policy.” 71
The OEIBA was modeled upon its Texas counterpart’s program
to allow employers to opt out of the state-run system of workers’ compensation. Under the OEIBA, employers could draft their own worker
compensation laws and decide which injuries the policies would
cover. 72 The OEIBA also permitted employers to limit injured
employees to certain physicians and how workers obtained
compensation from the employer as well as how disputes would be
handled. 73 Although the general premise of the Oklahoma and Texas
opt-out plans are the same, there are several key differences which
permitted the opt-out plan to survive in Texas despite a similar act
being overturned in Oklahoma. First, Oklahoma had an existing state
mandated workers’ compensation program 74 whereas Texas never had
a mandatory program. 75 Secondly, as the Oklahoma Supreme Court
would ultimately hold, the OEIBA did not guarantee all Oklahoma
workers’ the same rights when a work-related injury occurred. 76
Instead, the OEIBA allowed for employers to single out injured
67.

Workers' Compensation Code, ch. 318, 2011 Okla. Sess. Laws 2553, (repealed
2013).

68.

Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 85A, § 1 (West 2014).

69.

Id. § 3.

70.

2013 OK 108, 316 P.3d 924.

71.

Id. ¶ 2, 316 P.3d at 924.

72.

Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 85A, § 2(9)(a)–(g) (West 2013).

73.

Id.

74.

Title 85A. Workers’ Compensation, Okla. St. Courts Network, http:
//www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/Index.asp?ftdb=STOKSTB1&level=1
[https://perma.cc/6BZ3-FQFZ] (last visited Mar. 22, 2017).

75.

Morantz, supra note 19, at 47–48.

76.

Vasquez v. Dillard’s, Inc., 2016 OK 89, ¶ 19, 381 P.3d 768, 773 (“The Opt
Out Act does not guarantee members of the subject class, all employees, the
same rights when a work related injury occurs. Rather, it provides employers
the authority to single out their injured employees for inequitable treatment.”).
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employees for “inequitable treatment.” 77 The OEIBA expressly stated
that employers are not bound by the Oklahoma Workers’
Compensation Act unless expressly incorporated within the OEIBA.78
The OEIBA also failed to eliminate the exclusive remedy provision
that is found within the AWCA. 79
There were several constitutional challenges to the OEIBA. In
December 2013, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held the OEIBA to be
constitutional despite being challenged in Coates v. Fallin. 80 On September 13, 2016, however, the Oklahoma Supreme Court struck down
the OEIBA as unconstitutional in Vasquez v. Dillard’s. 81 The Vasquez
Court held that the legislation created two disparate classes of
workers and resulted in an “unconstitutional special law” under the
Oklahoma Constitution. 82 In Vasquez, the Court analyzed the issue of
whether the statute was a special law with a three-part test. The
Court’s analysis turned on: (1) whether the law was special or general,
(2) if it was a special law, then if a general law applied, and (3) if
there was no applicable general law, then was the special law
constitutionally permissible. 83 Under the Oklahoma Constitution,
77.

Id.

78.

Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 85A, § 203(B) (West 2015) (“The benefit plan shall
provide for payment of the same forms of benefits included in the Administrative Workers’ Compensation Act for temporary total disability . . . disfigurement, amputation or permanent total loss of use of a scheduled member, death and medical benefits as a result of an occupational injury, on a
no-fault basis, and with dollar, percentage and duration limits . . . contained
in Sections 45, 46 and 47 of this title. For this purpose, the standards for
determination of average weekly wage, death beneficiaries, and disability
under the Administrative Workers’ Compensation Act shall apply under the
Oklahoma Employee Injury Benefit Act; but no other provision of the Administrative Workers’ Compensation Act defining covered injuries, medical
management, dispute resolution or other process, funding, notices or penalties shall apply or otherwise be controlling under the Oklahoma Employee
Injury Benefit Act, unless expressly incorporated.”).

79.

Id. § 5(A) (West 2014) (“The rights and remedies granted to an employee
subject to the provisions of the Administrative Workers’ Compensation Act
shall be exclusive of all other rights and remedies of the employee . . . .”).

80.

Coates v. Fallin, 2013 OK 108, ¶ 3, 316 P.3d 924, 925 (holding that “Senate
Bill 1062, 2013 Okla. Sess. Laws, Ch. 208 is not unconstitutional as a
multiple-subject bill and that the Legislature has exercised proper authority
in a matter over which it has the power to act by adopting a code for the
future execution of workers’ compensation law in Oklahoma which comports
with the Okla. Const. art. 5, 57”).

81.

2016 OK 89, 381 P.3d 768.

82.

Id. (holding that “[t]he core provision of the Opt Out Act . . . creates impermissible, unequal, disparate treatment of a select group of injured workers”).

83.

Id. ¶ 11, 381 P.3d at 772.
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“[l]aws of a general nature shall have a uniform operation throughout
the State, and where a general law can be made applicable, no special
law shall be enacted.” 84 The Vasquez Court held that a special law is
one that has different treatment for “less than an entire class of
similarly affected person or things” whereas a general law applies to
all members of a class. 85 Dillard’s argued that the statutory class
created by the OEIBA was all Oklahoma employers rather than
injured employees. 86 Dillard’s relied on Grimes v. City of Oklahoma
City 87 in support of their proposition. 88 The Vasquez Court, however,
distinguished Grimes from the issue at bar because Grimes looked to
the title of the legislative act in determining the protected class and
did not deal with workers’ compensation. 89 In Vasquez, unlike Grimes,
the title of the OEIBA was aimed at employees and did not address
employers. 90 The Vasquez court further held that the legislative intent
behind the OEIBA was that the intended class were injured
employees rather than employers. 91
In Vasquez, Dillard’s argued that the OEIBA was constitutionally
valid even if it was found to be a special law since it was
“substantially and reasonably related to a legitimate government
objective.” 92 Dillard’s argued that the OEIBA allowed for a “more
effective system of identifying and treating workplace injuries;
improving access to medical treatment; improving worker health and
safety; and encouraging job creation.” 93 Dillard’s further contended
that to accomplish the aforementioned goals, the Oklahoma
Legislature gave employers the ability to implement the benefits to
their employees. 94 The Court, however, was not persuaded by
Dillard’s argument. The Court was unwilling to “accept the invitation
of employers to find a discriminatory state statue constitutional by
84.

Okla. Const. art. 5, § 59.

85.

Vasquez, ¶ 12, 381 P.3d at 772.

86.

Id. ¶ 15, 381 P.3d at 772.

87.

2002 OK 47, 49 P.3d 719 (upholding a municipality’s right to choose how to
financially support schools within the city limits against a special law attack).

88.

Vasquez, ¶ 16, 381 P.3d at 772.

89.

Id. ¶¶ 17–18, 381 P.3d at 772–73. The legislative act at issue in Grimes was
titled “Municipal Support of Public School Systems” while the legislative act
at issue in Vasquez was titled “Employee Injury Benefit Act.” Id.

90.

Id. ¶ 18, 381 P.3d at 772.

91.

Id. ¶ 18, 381 P.3d at 773.

92.

Id. ¶ 28, 381 P.3d at 774.

93.

Id.

94.

Id.
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relying on the interests of employers in reducing compensation
costs.” 95 The Court then analyzed whether or not a general law is
impossible due to certain circumstances or if the goals of the
legislation could be accomplished by a general law. 96 Finally, once the
Vasquez Court determined that the OEIBA was a special law, it
looked to see if the law was “substantially and reasonably related to a
legitimate government objective” so it could survive a constitutional
challenge. 97
The Vasquez Court further held that the OEIBA allows for employers to treat their employees inequitably when compared with employees who fall under the AWCA. 98 Under the OEIBA, employers are
not bound by the provisions of the AWCA for the “purpose of:
defining covered injuries; medical management; dispute resolution or
other process; funding; notices; or penalties” unless there is
incorporation of the AWCA’s standard into the OEIBA. 99 The
OEIBA clearly stated that “no other provision of the Administrative
Workers’ Compensation Act defining covered injuries, medical
management, dispute resolution or other process, funding, notices or
penalties shall apply or otherwise be controlling under the Oklahoma
Employee Injury Benefit Act, unless expressly incorporated.” 100 The
OEIBA ensured that injured employees under the OEIBA would not
receive the same protection of procedures as employees covered by the
AWCA. 101
The OEIBA failed in Oklahoma due to the already existing mandatory state-run workers’ compensation program. In Texas, however,
there was never a mandatory system of workers’ compensation. The
challenges faced in Oklahoma in implementing a new system creating
a different class of workers are likely to be experienced in other states
considering opt-out programs. Unlike in Texas, Oklahoma never
incorporated a provision to allow for equalization of bargaining by
permitting the employee to opt out of the alternative program and
instead sue in court for damages. Given the continued national
onslaught on compensation benefits through benefit cuts and opt-out
legislation, perhaps the great equalizer would be to give the injured

95.

Id. ¶ 29, 381 P.3d at 774 (citing Torres v. Seaboard Foods, LLC., 2016 OK
20, ¶ 47, 373 P.3d 1057, 1079 (2016)).

96.

Id. ¶¶ 31–32, 381 P.3d at 774–75.

97.

Id. ¶ 28, 381 P.3d at 774.

98.

Id. ¶ 19, 381 P.3d at 773.

99.

Id. ¶ 22, 381 P.3d at 773.

100. Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 85A, § 203(b) (West 2015).
101. Vasquez, ¶ 28, 381 P.3d at 774.
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worker back the right to sue for damages and recover more than the
paltry sum often guaranteed for injured workers.

III. Opting Out in Texas
Unlike the rest of the United States, Texas never had a
mandatory system of state-run workers’ compensation. Under Texas
law, an employer has the option to join the traditional workers’
compensation system with oversight by the Texas Department of
Insurance 102 or they can opt out of the statutory system and create a
“non-subscription” program, but would lose the exclusive remedy
provision and could become liable “for work related injuries under
common law principles of negligence,” 103 although they would gain
certain freedoms and advantages from state oversight. 104 Nonsubscribers could thus become liable to injured workers and be forced
to pay high awards if found negligent since they lose immunity from
lawsuits. 105 If a Texas employer choses to subscribe to the workers’
compensation system, then it can either buy an insurance policy
through a company licensed by the Texas Department of Insurance,
obtain certification from the DWC to self-insure any compensation
claims, join an approved self-insurance group, or be a self-insured
government entity. 106 Most of the non-subscriber plans are governed
under the Federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA), which allows for more freedom for employers than traditional state-run plans. 107 These opt-out plans greatly affect the statutorily defined benefits for injured workers, state measures that are designed to ensure that injured workers receive benefits, the use of state
administrative or civil courts in disputes, and the exclusive remedy
which was part of the original grand bargain. 108
102. See Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 406.002(a) (West 2016).
103. Brookshire Bros., Inc. v. Lewis, 997 S.W.2d 908, 912 (Tex. App. 1999)
(holding that Brookshire is a “nonsubscriber under the Texas workers’
compensation law. . . . [and] is responsible for work-related injuries under
common law principles of negligence”); see also Werner v. Colwell, 909
S.W.2d 866, 868 (Tex. 1995).
104. Information for Workers’ Compensation Non-subscribers, Tex. Dep’t of
Ins., https://www.tdi.texas.gov/wc/employer/cb007.html [https://perma.cc/
W3JA-4NRR] (last updated Feb. 24, 2017).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. New St. Grp., Workers’ Compensation Opt-Out: Can
Privatization
Work?
8
(2012),
https://www.sedgwick.com/NewsRelease/WCOpt-OutStudy.pdf
[https://perma.cc/CM62-YRV8].
108. Id. at 6.
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These alternative policies are touted as a less costly option for the
employer typically because they have a specific policy and benefit
limits for employees. 109 Costs were often kept lower than through
workers’ compensation due to not covering partial, total, or
permanent total disabilities; medical benefits limited to two years
rather than lifetime coverage; capped death benefits; and per-person
or per-event capped limits on benefits. 110 As of 2012, about one-third
of Texas employers were non-subscribers. 111 This number is almost the
lowest it has been according to a study spanning nearly two
decades, 112 but this had not diminished other states’ interest in the
non-subscription option. 113 Interestingly, the greatest number of nonsubscribers employed fewer than five employees. 114 A 2012 study
revealed that fifteen percent of non-subscribers were primarily
concerned with the high costs of insurance premiums. 115 The same
primary financial concerns were echoed by large non-subscribing
companies in 2012. 116 Another 2012 study, however, revealed that
more often than not, subscribing employers did not experience a
change in their premium. 117

109. Id.
110. Id. at 15 (citing Alison Morantz, Opting Out of Workers’ Compensation in
Texas: A Survey of Large, Multistate Nonsubscribers, in Regulation vs.
Litigation: Perspectives from Economics and Law 197 (Daniel
Kessler ed., 2010).
111. Workers’ Comp. Research & Evaluation Grp., Tex. Dep’t of Ins.,
Employer Participation in the Texas Workers’ Compensation
System: 2012 Estimates 6 (2012), https://www.tdi.texas.gov/reports/
wcreg/documents/2012_Nonsub.pdf [https://perma.cc/HXU5-CXWA].
112. See id. The first study of the percentage of Texas non-subscribers was in
1993. The 1993 study showed that forty-four percent of employers were
non-subscribers. In 2010, this number dipped down to an all-time low of
thirty-two percent. This number increased in 2012 to thirty-three percent
of employers. Id.
113. See supra note 11 and accompanying text (noting the increased support for
alternative opt-out programs).
114. Workers’ Comp. Research & Evaluation Grp., Tex. Dep’t of Ins.,
supra note 111, at 8.
115. Id. at 13. Other primary reasons given were too few employees, workers’
compensation was not mandatory, high medical costs, and few on-the-job
injuries. Id.
116. Id. at 14. Non-subscribing employers with 500 or more employees were primarily concerned with high insurance premiums (twenty-three percent) and
high medical costs within the workers’ compensation system (twenty-four
percent). Id.
117. Id. at 16.
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Texas, however, retained the right for an employee to sue for
common law tort damages if their employer elected to opt out of the
workers’ compensation system, even if the employer opted to purchase
alternative coverage. 118 Employers that opted out of the typical
system can be sued under tort law and lose their right to common law
defenses, which includes key defenses that were used prior to the
introduction of workers’ compensation laws in the early 1900s.119 For
example, under Texas law, an employer loses the defense of
contributory negligence, assumption of the risk, or that the injury or
death was caused by a negligent co-worker. 120 In order to avoid
liability, the employer must show that the employee was solely
responsible for their injury. 121
If an employee does sue the employer for civil damages, their
ability to recover from the employer is often limited by the opt-out
plans which typically do not cover attorney’s fees, judgments for pain
and suffering, or punitive damages. 122 If the employer decides to
provide the employee with an alternative benefit plan after they opted
out of the state system, then the employer can require that the
employee waive their right to sue in tort and instead submit to
arbitration. 123 Traditionally, Texas law prohibited an employee from
preemptively waiving their right to sue an employer. 124 Prior to 2001,
Texas employers that opted out often required employees to waive
their rights to sue for future injuries as a condition to employment,
thereby limiting an employers’ future risk related to an employee’s
ability to recover in tort. 125 Concerns arose that employees were being
118. Tex. Dep’t of Ins., supra note 104.
119. See Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 406.033(a)(1-3) (West 2016) (“In an action
against an employer . . . who is not covered by workers’ compensation insurance obtained in the manner authorized by Section 406.003 . . . it is not a
defense that: the employee was guilty of contributory negligence; the
employee assumed the risk of injury or death; or the injury or death was
caused by the negligence of a fellow employee.”).
120. Id.
121. See New St. Grp., supra note 107, at 14 (“Texas courts have interpreted
the removal of the contributory negligence defense to mean that employers
must prove that employees are solely responsible for their injury to escape
liability.”).
122. See Tex. Dep’t of Ins., supra note 104 (explaining that non-subscribers
do not enjoy the limited liability subscribers enjoy and may be liable for
damages for pain and suffering, as well as legal expenses).
123. See Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 406.033(e)–(f) (West 2016).
124. See New St. Grp., supra note 107, at 14.
125. Jason Ohana, Note, Texas Elective Workers’ Compensation: A Model of
Innovation?, 2 Wm. & Mary Bus. L. Rev. 323, 342 (2011). Ohana asserts
that by waiving negligence claims before employment began, the employer
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taken advantage of since they were not injured at the time they
signed the contract and so were unlikely to consult with attorneys
who could evaluate the arbitration agreement. 126 In 2001, the Texas
legislature attempted to limit the potential for abuse by an employer
who required employees to waive their rights to litigate for future
claims. 127
Following 2001’s legislative reform, a preemptive waiver to litigate
future injuries became theoretically unenforceable in Texas courts. In
spite of the legislative reform, employers found a way around this
legal hurdle by requiring employees to sign arbitration agreements
usually before an injury occurred. 128 By 2012, fourteen percent of nonsubscribing employers required employees to agree to resolve disputes
by arbitration. 129 Ninety percent of non-subscribers required
employees to sign the arbitration agreement prior to employment
before any possible work-related injury could occur. 130 Injured
employees brought suit alleging that arbitration agreements violated
Texas law. However, Texas courts consistently held that the Federal
Arbitration Act preempts the Texas statutory prohibition.131
could calculate possible negligence and benefits claims with a great degree
of accuracy. The employer would know what remedy employees could utilize,
thus lowering employers’ costs. An employer would provide employees with
an “often inferior benefits package” because the employer required
prospective employees to waive the rights that would have been waived
under a state-run workers’ compensation system. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 342–43 (citing Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 406.033(e) (West 2009)).
128. Id. at 343–44.
129. Workers’ Comp. Research & Evaluation Grp., Tex. Dep’t of Ins.,
supra note 111, at 32. The number of employers requiring arbitration
increased from nine percent in 2010. Id.
130. Id. This number was at ninety percent as of 2012 and was ninety-eight percent in 2010. Id.
131. In re Bison Bldg. Materials, Ltd., Nos. 01-07-00003-CV, 01-07-00029-CV,
2008 WL 2548568, at *10 (Tx. Ct. App. June 26, 2008) (“We . . . now hold
that the FAA preempts any potential application of the Texas non-waiver
provision stated in Labor Code section 406.033€ to prevent enforcement of
the arbitration clause stated in the [p]lan.”); In re Border Steel, Inc., 229
S.W.3d 825, 832 (Tx. Ct. App. 2007) (“The Texas Labor Code provides that
any agreement by an employee to waive a cause of action or any right described in section 406.033(a), which is executed before the employee’s injury
or death, is void and unenforceable. We have already determined that the
provisions of the FAA are applicable to this case, based on Border Steel’s
interstate activities. Therefore, the FAA preempts the application of the
Texas non-waiver provision to prevent the enforcement of the Arbitration
Agreement at issue here.”); In re R & R Pers. Specialists of Tyler, Inc., 146
S.W.3d 699, 703–04 (Tx. Ct. App. 2004) (“Consequently, the FAA preempts state statutes to the extent they are inconsistent with that Act . . .
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Therefore, the Texas statue preventing employees from waiving rights
over future injuries was rendered ineffective through arbitration
agreements prior to employment. The rights of injured employees to
compensation benefits continues to be eroded through arbitration
agreements signed prior to injuries. Employees are unlikely to
understand the significance of what they are signing and are in an
inherently unequal bargaining position since they would likely need
the employment more than their employer needs them.

IV. The Feasibility of Emulating Opt-Out Acts in
States with Constitutional Provisions
It is easy to lose focus on who workers’ compensation was
originally designed to protect when viewing workers’ compensation
plans solely through a financial lens. States created constitutional
provisions to enact workers’ compensation provisions; unfortunately,
workers’ compensation benefits have not kept up with inflation or the
rising costs of living. 132 The debate surrounding workers’
compensation cuts intensified nationally, affecting more states than
just Oklahoma and Texas. In August 2014, a Florida Circuit Judge
held Florida’s system of workers’ compensation to be unconstitutional
in Cortes v. Velda Farms. 133 The Cortes Court held the exclusive
remedy provision of the Florida workers’ compensation act to be
invalid and unconstitutional because it failed to provide for a
“reasonable alternative remedy to the tort remedy it supplanted.”134
The Court in Cortes supported its holding by analyzing how the
Legislature repealed numerous benefits since 1968, “including
permanent partial disability without replacing any of them with
equivalent benefits.” 135 The Cortes Court concluded that to pass
constitutional muster the exclusive replacement remedy must provide
for significant benefits to the injured worker. 136 However, “without full
medical care or indemnity for permanent partial loss of wage earning
capacity,” the Florida workers’ compensation act failed to provide a
reasonable alternative than originally existed in tort law. 137
We conclude that the FAA preempts the application of the nonwaiver provision to prevent or restrict enforcement of the arbitration provisions at issue
here.”).
132. Jack B. Hood et al., Workers’ Compensation and Employee Protection Laws in a Nutshell 89 (6th ed. 2016).
133. No. 11-13661, 2014 WL 6685226 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Aug. 13, 2014).
134. Id. at *10.
135. Id.
136. Id. at *9.
137. Id. at *10.
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Cortes and Vasquez are just two examples of many of the states’
recent attempts at limiting workers’ compensation benefits at the expense of the injured worker without providing for some form of alternative remedy in exchange for the rights injured workers surrendered
years ago in the “grand bargain.” Compensation benefits are not uniform across the United States, so workers in some states experience
greater benefits and protections while others struggle to survive on
benefits that keep them well below the poverty line. 138 Benefits vary
greatly between neighboring states so that an amputated arm in one
state is worth $45,000, but in a neighboring state it is worth nearly
three-quarters of a million dollars. 139 The disparity for injuries is so
great that in Illinois a lost testicle is worth nearly $100,000, but in
Minnesota a testicle is worth less than $5,000. 140 The constant
chipping away of benefits by state legislatures allows for two men who
were injured on the job in neighboring states to have vastly different
outcomes.
Jeremy Lewis’s and Josh Potter’s stories are remarkably similar,
yet have strikingly different consequences. Both men were in their 20s
when they were injured on the job at southern industrial plants and
each lost part of their left arms. 141 Lewis was awarded $45,000 in
workers’ compensation, while Potter’s total benefits will exceed
$740,000 during his lifetime. 142 The difference in total amounts of
benefits received for a comparable injury is due to Potter losing his
arm in Georgia while Lewis was injured in Alabama, only fifty miles
from the Georgia line. 143 Due to Alabama’s minimal workers’
compensation benefits, Jeremy Lewis’s life took a downward spiral
138. Michael Grabell, U.S. Labor Department: States Are Failing Injured
Workers, ProPublica (Oct. 5, 2016, 6:01 AM), https://www.propublica.org/
article/us-labor-department-states-are-failing-injured-workers [https://perma
.cc/C6W6-EWXN].
139. Id.
140. Lena Groeger, Michael Grabell, ProPublica, & Cynthia Cotts, Workers
Comp Benefits: How Much is a Limb Worth?, ProPublica (Mar. 5, 2015),
https://projects.propublica.org/graphics/workers-compensation-benefits-bylimb [https://perma.cc/33XJ-V2EW] (select “Testicle” from drop-down
menu listing body parts) (explaining that as of 2015, the maximum compensation for one testicle in Illinois is $73,537 but in Minnesota one testicle is
worth $3,750 in workers’ compensation benefits).
141. Michael Grabell & Howard Berkes, How Much Is Your Arm Worth?
Depends on Where You Work, ProPublica (Mar. 5, 2015), https://www.
propublica.org/article/how-much-is-your-arm-worth-depends-where-you-work
[https://perma.cc/M476-UARE].
142. Id.
143. Id. See also Groeger, Grabell, ProPublica & Cotts, supra note 140
(depicting the cost of a limb state-by-state).
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after he lost his arm. Lewis claims that after his injury he “lost
everything” that he owned from his three-bedroom home in a new
development to his three new cars. 144 Lewis then had no other option
but to move his family into a “rundown singlewide trailer on the
outskirts of town.” 145 Lewis’s tragic story is but one of many injured
workers for whom the workers’ compensation failed them. Workers’
compensation benefits are now at the lowest in decades since the
1970s and are not providing for injured workers in the way that the
program was originally designed. 146
Opt-out proponents argue that opt-out provisions will keep costs
low without cutting benefits for injured workers. Supporters cite
Texas as a model for other states. A 2016 study showed that Texas
has one of the most affordable workers’ compensation coverage
whereas Alabama’s compensation rates, despite its limited
compensation benefits plan, are higher than Texas’s. 147 Despite its
flaws, the Texas system can provide a model for other states to follow
when constructing opt-out systems. The Cortes Court summarized the
challenge to workers’ compensation seen nationally—multiple classes
of benefits that were eliminated and cut back without replacing them
with anything. 148 Injured workers are no longer receiving what they
originally contracted for and the “grand bargain” has become
distinctly one sided. Under the Texas system, workers can opt out of
alternative coverage and instead retain the right to sue in tort. 149 The
biggest challenge for other states seeking to implement some form of
alternative benefit plan is the same issue faced by Oklahoma, which
led to a constitutional challenge over the creation of two classes of
workers singled out for disparate treatment.
Opt-out plans have significant setbacks to the rights of injured
workers that should be carefully evaluated when states decide whether
or not to implement a form of opt-out plans like in Texas. For
example, opt-out plans usually have a shortened time frame for
144. Grabell & Berkes, supra note 141.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Don Jergler, Report Shows California and New Jersey Have Highest
Workers’
Comp
Rates,
Ins.
J.
(Oct.
18,
2016),
http://www.insurancejournal.com/
news/national/2016/10/18/429683.htm [https://perma.cc/FC63-3DRS].
148. Cortes v. Velda Farms, No. 11-13661, 2014 WL 6685226, *8–9 (Fla. Cir. Ct.
Aug. 13, 2014).
149. Stephanie K. Jones, Opting Out of Texas Workers’ Comp Doesn’t Have to
Mean Going Bare, Ins. J. (June 5, 2014), http://www.insurancejournal
.com/news/southcentral/2014/06/05/330945.htm [https://perma.cc/ZPJ3UKHB].
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reporting injuries. 150 In Texas, injured workers covered under opt-out
plans are required to report workplace injuries in twenty-four hours
versus the typical thirty days required by most state-run programs.151
Additionally, medical coverage is often limited in terms of length.152
Non-subscribing employers can also have less state oversight than
employers enrolled in traditional plans and employers can terminate
benefits under opt-out plans if the employees do not follow the
guidelines. 153 In 2015, NPR and ProPublica looked into 120 companies
who set up their own injury benefit plans under the OEIBA and
compared them with traditional state-run programs. In this study,
they found that employers were able to pay workers far less under
OEIBA than they would under traditional workers’ compensation
plans. 154

Conclusion
Texas’s opt-out plan can provide a model for other states, particularly in light of the way multiple state legislatures chipped away at
benefits for injured workers over the years. While the Texas model is
a far from perfect solution to the rising costs and limited benefits,
portions of the system could work in other states even if they have
existing constitutional provisions for state-run workers’ compensation
systems. The great fault in the OEIBA was due to the creation of two
disparate groups of employees. However, like the Cortes Court held,
the existing system has left the workers’ compensation system to be a
mere shadow of itself and nothing more than a “pathway to poverty
for the injured worker.” 155 Perhaps a viable solution would be to
150. Suzzanne W. Decker & Nicole K. Whitecar, Opt-Out Workers’
Compensation Plans Could be a Beneficial Option, Miles & Stockbridge
(Oct. 28, 2015), http://www.milesstockbridge.com/labor-employmentbenefits-immigration-blog/posts/opt-out-workers-compensation-plans-couldbe-beneficial-option/ [https://perma.cc/L7B4-ZJAQ].
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Grabell & Berkes, supra note 11 (explaining that Costco, a non-subscriber,
paid $15,000 for an amputated finger, but Wal-Mart paid $25,000 for the
same amputated finger).
155. Howard Berkes, Labor Secretary Calls Workers’ Comp Opt-Out Plans a
‘Pathway to Poverty,’ NPR (Mar. 25, 2016, 1:29 PM), http://www.npr.org/
sections/thetwo-way/2016/03/25/471849458/labor-secretary-calls-workerscomp-opt-out-plans-a-pathway-to-poverty [https://perma.cc/6RCY-MHZW]
(explaining that former Labor Secretary Thomas Perez confirmed an investigation into opt-out programs that saved millions of dollars but created
a “pathway to poverty” for injured workers).
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incorporate a provision to allow for injured workers’ to opt out of
either the traditional workers’ compensation system or the opt-out
programs and instead sue for civil monetary damages. Although suing
in tort is riskier than accepting a predetermined, albeit limited, set of
monetary awards, few injured workers are able to support themselves
with a decent quality of life under existing workers’ compensation
systems throughout the United States.
The Texas legislature already eliminated common law defenses for
negligence including assumption of the risk, negligence of a co-worker,
and contributory negligence. This, too, is an equalizer for injured employees. If this were expanded into other states, then perhaps more
employers would be concerned about liability due to the elimination
of commonly used defenses and expand benefits under opt-out plans
to avoid tort liability. The system that has arisen today has left
significant room for improvement and expansion with regards to
treatment for injured workers. On the other hand, if employers were
to adopt alternative benefit plans that have shown a reduction in
costs to employers than employers may be more inclined to implement
opt-out programs. Finally, the Texas system permits arbitration
agreements prior to employment, which include a waiver for any
future injuries since this is governed under federal law, thus,
preempting existing Texas statutes. For future states, this could
present a significant problem to alternative opt-out plans since it
would hinder states’ ability to limit potential abuse to employees
through statutory law. The Texas system has significant flaws;
however, in light of expanding restrictions on workers’ compensation
benefits, perhaps the Texas model can provide legislatures with a
feasible template in constructing opt-out legislation in the future.
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